The connections
that make it work.
Three views of the actual system. Each separates authority, executable source and data rather than drawing every service as the same box.
The agent runs the work.
- MP: intent and authority
Human authentication and consequential approval. - External Codex
Checks its workspace, GitHub and Cloudflare tools. - Exact source and deployment
Builds, tests, publishes within authority. - Verified HTTPS
Checks identity and real interaction.
Read the flow in text
MP provides intent and only unavoidable human capabilities. The authorised external Codex task verifies its actual repository and Cloudflare tools, builds and tests exact source, deploys within existing authority, then checks HTTPS identity and interaction. The public site cannot inherit those credentials. Woodhouse operates implementation without becoming a customer runtime dependency.
Pin the code. Keep privacy current.
Two independent sources
Guestbook and Showcase have separate GitHub repositories and standalone Workers. A compatible upstream commit is a candidate, never an automatic replacement for Composer’s mounted code.
A composed release
The whole composition digest names its integrated services, including dependency pins. The root activates those bindings only after review. Deployment verifies the root and both mounted source identities.
One current privacy decision
Guestbook owns D1 moderation and private R2 media. Standalone and integrated code read that current app-owned state. Showcase features reference stable item IDs, then resolve current source eligibility.
Hide or delete a source item and controlled requests revoke it. Restoring an older executable cannot restore a previous approval or a deleted image.
Read the update boundary in text
GitHub source histories remain independent. The validated composition locks their commits and uses immutable service identities derived from the full input digest. Staging a new dependency cannot mutate an old service. App data remains with its owner. Code rollback restores a reviewed root and pinned services; metadata/media recovery is a separate authorised operation.
The key doesn’t cross.
- Fictional document
Identity, memories and reviewed checkpoints. - Local encryption
Owner keeps the passphrase separately. - Encrypted export
Only ciphertext is retained. - Explicit disclosure
A reviewed selection crosses; the key does not.
Read the privacy boundary in text
The synthetic document is encrypted locally using AES-GCM and an owner-held passphrase-derived key. The ciphertext export and passphrase stay separate. A different action previews an exact memory subset and requires explicit consent before plaintext clipboard disclosure. Neither the key nor unselected memories is included. No real private-data security assurance or server sync is claimed.